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ABSTRACT
This paper examines a competitive model of add-on pricing, the practice of advertising low prices
for one good in hopes of selling additional products (or a higher quality product) to consumers at
a high price at the point of sale. The main conclusion is that add-on pricing softens price competition








In many businesses it is customary to advertise a base price for a product or service and
to try to induce customers to buy additional “add-ons” at high prices at the point of sale.
The quoted price for a hotel room may not include phone calls, in-room movies, minibar
items, dry cleaning, etc. Electronics stores oﬀer extended warranties and accessories. Car
rental agencies oﬀer insurance and prepaid gasoline. New car dealers hope to service cars
they sell. Add-ons need not be a separate goods. For example, a high quality mattress can
be thought of as a bundle containing a low quality mattress and an add-on of additional
quality. Once one starts to think broadly about add-on pricing, it can be challenge to think
of a business where the practice is absent.
Although many ﬁrms earn a substantial portion of their revenue from add-ons, it is
not clear that we should care.1 The classic Chicago school argument would be that proﬁts
earned on add-ons will be competed away in the form of lower prices for the base good.
Two formalizations of this argument can be found in the literature. Lal and Matutes (1994)
develops a model of loss-leader pricing in which the Chicago view is true to an extreme
– every consumer purchases the same bundle at the same price regardless of whether the
prices of add-ons are or are not advertised. Verboven (1999) analyzes a model of add-on
pricing with diﬀerent assumptions about preferences in which add-on pricing again has
no eﬀect on proﬁts. This paper, in contrast, argues that add-on pricing is important. It
notes that there is an adverse selection problem that arises when competing ﬁrms practice
second degree price discrimination, and shows that as a result add-on pricing may soften
competition and raise equilibrium proﬁts.
The model of this paper is similar to the model of Lal and Matutes (1994), but with
horizontal and vertical taste diﬀerences. Two ﬁrms are located at the opposite ends of a
Hotelling line. Each ﬁrm has two products for sale: a base good and an add-on. The add-on
provides additional utility if consumed with the base good. There are two continuums of
consumers: “high types” with a low marginal utility of income; and “low types” or “cheap-
skates” with a high marginal utility of income. Within each subpopulation, consumers have
1CNNMoney reported that the credit card industry received $7 billion in late payment fees in 2001. See
http://money.cnn.com/2002/05/21/pf/banking/cardfees/.
1have unit demands for the base good with the standard uniformly distributed idiosyncratic
preference for buying from ﬁrm 1 or ﬁrm 2. As in Verboven (1999), the analysis consists
primarily of an analysis of two games: a “standard” pricing game in which the ﬁrms simul-
taneously announce both a price for the base good and a price for a bundle containing the
base good and the add-on; and an add-on pricing game in which the ﬁrms only announce
the price for the base good and consumers do not learn the price of the add-on until they
have incurred a sunk cost to visit the ﬁrm.
It is not hard to construct models in which add-on pricing is irrelevant: the simplest
would be a price competition game where ﬁrms announce a price and then charge all con-
sumers exactly $17 more than the price they announced. Section 3 shows that a benchmark
case of the model described above is another example. As long as the preferences of the
high and low types are not too dissimilar the standard pricing game and the add-on pricing
game have identical outcomes: every consumer makes the same purchase and pays the same
price in the two games and the ﬁrms are therefore also equally well oﬀ.
Section 4 contains the main result of the paper. It shows that when the high and low
types are more diﬀerent, the ﬁrms’ proﬁts are higher in the add-on pricing game than in
the standard pricing game. My view is that this should not just be of interest to those
who work on pricing and those who regard the mechanism as neat. To the contrary, I
suspect that add-on pricing may be an important component of the correct explanation
for how ﬁrms are able to survive in world with substantial ﬁxed costs. In many of the
examples given in the ﬁrst paragraph, e.g. hotels, car rental agencies, and retail stores,
prices must be substantially above marginal costs to recover ﬁxed costs. Although the
industrial organization literature has a number of standard explanations for how marginal
cost pricing can be avoided, such as product diﬀerentiation, search costs, and dynamic
collusion, it is not clear that they can account for observed markups. Do consumers really
have strong preferences for getting a Dollar rental car over a National rental car, for staying
at the Hyatt instead of the Marriott, or for shopping at Sears instead of K-mart? The
competition-softening eﬀect of add-on pricing may be an important additional factor.
Comparing the add-on pricing game with the standard pricing game, I ﬁnd that low
types pay less in the add-on pricing game, while the high types pay more. The consumer
welfare implications are more stark when comparing the outcome of the add-on pricing
2game with a with what would happen if ﬁrms could be prevented from selling the low
quality good, e.g. if refueling charges at car rental agencies were limited to a reasonable
per gallon price. In this comparison, both types of consumers are made worse oﬀ by the
feasibility of add-on pricing.
One way to understand the main result is to think of it as a “strategic investment”
story. When the low and high types’ marginal utilities of income are suﬃciently diﬀerent,
selling the add-on to the high types at a high price is more proﬁtable than selling the
add-on to everyone at a low price. In equilibrium, of course, consumers are not fooled.
The add-ons do, however, end up being more expensive than they weould be if all prices
were advertised, so add-on pricing can be seen as a strategic commitment to charge a high
price for the add-on. Such a commitment will obviously aﬀect equilibrium proﬁts. Section
4 presents intuition for why the commitment increases proﬁts.
Another way to think about the main result is to regard it as a story about ﬁrms
intentionally creating an adverse selection problem in order to soften competition. In the
health insurance market, adverse selection limits the completeness of insurance policies –
if a ﬁrm were to oﬀer a more complete policy, then it would attract a customer pool with
disproportionate share of sick people. When customers are heterogeneous in their marginal
utility of income, there is a similar selection eﬀect: a ﬁrm that undercuts its rivals on price
will attract a customer pool that contains a disproportionate share of cheapskates. If each
ﬁrm sells a single good, this selection eﬀect is not adverse – a cheapskate’s money is as
good as anyone else’s. When ﬁrms oﬀer multiple goods and add-on pricing policies keep
the low- and high quality prices far apart, the selection becomes adverse – ﬁrms do not
want to attract a large number of cheapskates who only buy the loss leader. The incentive
to cut price is reduced, and hence equilibrium proﬁts go up.
Sections 3 and 4 demonstrate that ﬁrms may be better oﬀ if they jointly choose to set
prices and advertise as in the add-on pricing game. They do not address whether setting
prices as in the add-on pricing game is individually rational in an expanded model where
what is advertised when is endogenous. Section 5 notes that if one endogenizes the price-
setting and advertising process in the simplest way, then adopting add-on pricing is not
individually rational. It then discusses a number of natural variants of the model in which
ﬁrms would individually choose to adopt add-on pricing policies.
3Section 6 examines a variant of the model in which only a small fraction of the population
are cheapskates. In this model adopting add-on pricing is a classic example of a competitive
strategy that turns lemons into lemonade. It does not just mitigate the damage that
cheapskates do to equilibrium proﬁts; it creates an environment where ﬁrms beneﬁt from
the presence of cheapskates.
Section 7 relates the paper to the literatures on loss-leaders, competitive price discrim-
ination, and other topics. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
I consider a variant of the standard competition-on-a-line model with vertical as well as
horizontal diﬀerentiation. There are two ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ {1,2}. Each ﬁrm sells two
vertically diﬀerentiated goods, L and H, and prices piL and piH. The ﬁrms can produce
either L or H at a constant marginal cost of c.2 Consumers diﬀer in two dimensions. First,
they diﬀer in their marginal utility α of income. There are a unit mass of consumers with
α = αh and a unit mass of consumers with α = α`. We assume αh < α`. Thinking
about their willingness to pay I will refer to group h as the “high” types and to group `
as the “low” or “cheapskate” types. Within each group customers are diﬀerentiated by a
parameter θ ∼ U[0,1] that reﬂects how well the two ﬁrms’ products match their tastes.3
Assume that each consumer wishes to purchase at most one unit of one of the two products.
Assume that a consumer receives zero utility if he or she does not make a purchase. If a
consumer of type (α,θ) purchases exactly one unit his or her utility is
u(q1L,q1H,q2L,q2H;α,θ) =

        
        
v − θ − αp1H if q1H = 1
v − (1 − θ) − αp2H if q2H = 1
v − w − θ − αp1L if q1L = 1
v − w − (1 − θ) − αp2L if q2L = 1
Note the assumption of a lower marginal utility of income implies that the high types have
a higher incremental valuation for high quality in money terms and are less sensitive to
2Good L can be thought of as a “damaged good” as in Deneckere and McAfee (1996).
3Note that I have ﬁxed the range of the idiosyncratic taste parameter. To capture markets with only a
small amount of horizontal diﬀerentiation, one would assume that α` and αh are both large.
4price diﬀerences between the ﬁrms. One could apply the model to any situation where this
association makes sense even if it has nothing to do with diﬀerences in the marginal utility
of wealth. For example, in the credit card market the low types could be wealthier, more
sophisticated consumers who compare annual fees and interest rates more carefully when
choosing between oﬀers and who also are less likely to incur late payment fees.
Sections 3 and 4 will contrast the outcomes of two games: a standard price competition
game in which the ﬁrms simultaneously post prices for both products; and an add-on pricing
game where the ﬁrms post prices for good L and reveal their prices for good H only when
consumers visit the ﬁrm. Consumers will, of course, have rational expectations about the
nonposted prices. To model what happens if (out of equilibrium) these expectations turn
out to be incorrect, I adopt a version of Diamond’s search model where consumers incur a
small sunk cost of s utils in visiting a ﬁrm. This cost must be incurred to purchase from
a store or to learn its price for good H. Timelines for the standard pricing game and the
add-on pricing game are shown below.4 The standard pricing game is similar, but with
each ﬁrm choosing both prices at t = 1 and with consumers observing all prices.
In analyzing the model I will look at sequential equilibria. If the model were speciﬁed as
a game between the ﬁrms with consumer behavior represented by demand functions, then
it would be a complete information game in which one would require subgame perfection.
With consumers as players in the game, however, one must deal with consumers’ beliefs
about the nonposted prices. The key restriction that sequential equilibrium places on these
beliefs is that if a consumer visits ﬁrm 1 at t = 3 and learns that it has deviated from its
equilibrium strategy, then the consumer continues to believe that ﬁrm 2’s nonposted price
is given by ﬁrm 2’s equilibrium strategy. In the standard pricing game the sequential and
subgame perfect equilibria coincide.
In the model all consumers will purchase either L or H in equilibrium if v is suﬃciently
large. Rather than letting this paper get cluttered with statements about how large v must
be at various points, I will just make the blanket assumption here that v is suﬃciently large
so that all consumers are served in the relevant cases and not mention it again.
4The slightly odd-looking assumption that consumers can not visit a store at t = 4 if they have not
visited a store at t = 3 is a device to rule out equilibria in which all consumers wait until t = 4 to shop and
thereby lose the opportunity to switch stores if prices are not as they expect.







Consumers see p1L and p2L.
They can choose at cost s
to visit one ﬁrm. If so, they
see piH and can buy L or H.
Consumers who visited a
store at t = 3 may incur s
to visit the other store.
If so, they can buy or not.





Consumers see all prices.
They can choose at cost s
to visit one ﬁrm. If so, they
can buy L or H from it.
Consumers who visited a
store at t = 3 may incur s
to visit the other store.
If so, they can buy or not.
The Add-on Pricing Game
The Standard Pricing Game
Figure 1: Timelines for the standard pricing and add-on pricing games
3 The Lal-Matutes benchmark: add-ons sold to everyone
have no eﬀect
Although Lal and Matutes (1994) is best-known for its conclusion that multi-product re-
tailers may advertise a single good at a low price to save on advertising expenditures, it also
contains an irrelevance result about loss-leader pricing – it shows that the bundle of goods
each consumer purchases and the total amount each consumer pays are exactly the same
with loss-leader pricing as they are when all prices were advertised.5 With no advertising
costs this results in proﬁts being equal as well. When αh = α`, the add-on pricing game of
this paper is essentially the same as that of Lal and Matutes. In this section, I verify that
the irrelevance result also carries over when αh and α` are a bit diﬀerent.
5The exact irrelevance result obviously requires special assumptions. Most notably, demands must be
completely inelastic up to a cutoﬀ point. I have chosen to make the same assumptions here both because
it makes the model tractable and because it creates the contrast that highlights the competition-softening
eﬀect discussed in the next section.
6Intuitively, the result should not be surprising. When α` and αh are not too diﬀerent,
customers can forecast that they will be held up for the low type’s valuation for the add-on
once they visit the ﬁrm. Hence, it is little diﬀerent from a game where instead of announcing
their prices, ﬁrms announce a number that is exactly $17 below their price. The argument
is virtually identical to that of Lal and Matutes (and tedious) so I will not try to prove
it under the weakest possible assumptions and will only sketch the argument in the text
leaving the details to the appendix.
Proposition 1 Suppose α`/αh ≤ 1.6. Write α for (α` + αh)/2. Then for v suﬃciently
large
(a) In any symmetric pure-strategy sequential equilibrium of the standard pricing game all
consumers buy the high-quality good from the closest ﬁrm at a price of c + 1/α.
(b) In any symmetric pure-strategy sequential equilibrium of the add-on pricing game all
consumers buy the high-quality good from the closest ﬁrm at a price of c + 1/α.
Sketch of Proof
(a) In the standard pricing game, if all consumers buy H at a price of p∗
H, then if ﬁrm
1 deviates to a price p1H in a neighborhood of p∗










A necessary condition for Nash equilibrium is that the derivative of this expression be zero
at p1H = p∗








, which implies that any equilibrium of this
form has p∗
H = c + 1/α.
The proof in the appendix veriﬁes that the various possible nonlocal deviations also
do not increase a ﬁrm’s proﬁts and hence that any proﬁle where each ﬁrm’s prices satisfy
piH = c + 1/α and piL ≥ c + 1/α − w/α` does yield an equilibrium.
The one alternate form of equilibrium that is not implausible is that the ﬁrms might sell
good L to the low types and good H to the high types as part of a “damaged good” second-
degree price discrimination strategy as in Deneckere and McAfee (1996). Damaged goods,
however, are not always useful in price discrimination models. Good L is less valuable, but
no less costly to produce. To get the low types to buy L instead of H, it must be oﬀered at a
7substantially lower markup. The appendix shows that for the parameter values considered
here (with α` and αh not too diﬀerent) this makes the damaged good strategy nonviable.
(b) In the add-on pricing model, we can think of the ﬁrm i as advertising a price piL
for good L at t = 1 and then choosing a nonposted price piU ≡ piH − piL for an upgrade
from L to H at t = 2. As in Diamond (1971), the fact that consumers search costs are
sunk when they arrive at the ﬁrm ensures that the ﬁrms will set the monopoly price for
the upgrade in equilibrium. When p1L and p2L are not too diﬀerent and α` and αh are
suﬃciently close together, a monopolist would choose to sell the upgrade to everyone at
a price of w/α`. When p1L is in a neighborhood of the symmetric equilibrium price p∗
L,
consumers will correctly anticipate that if they visit ﬁrm j they will end up buying H at a









(p1L + w/α` − c).
The FOC gives that the only possible equilibrium price is p∗
L = c + 1/α − w/α`.
The proof in the appendix again veriﬁes that there is an equilibrium in which ﬁrms
charge this price for the low-quality good and that there are no other symmetric pure-
strategy equilibria.
QED
Note that although everyone buys good H at a price of c + 1/α, the price of good L is
c + 1/α − w/α`. The proposition contains no restrictions on w, so this price can be below
cost. Lal and Matutes (1994) describe their model as a model of loss leaders for this reason.
In Verboven’s (1999) model consumers are horizontally and vertically diﬀerentiated and
the complete irrelevance result of Lal and Matutes does not hold. Low types pay less in
the add-on pricing game than in the standard pricing game and high types pay more. The
proﬁts part of the irrelevance result nonetheless carries over. The higher price paid by one
group exactly oﬀsets the lower prices paid by the other and the ﬁrms’s proﬁts are identical
in the two games.6
6I thank Frank Verboven for this observation.
84 Discriminatory add-on pricing softens competition
In this section I present the paper’s main observation – that add-on pricing softens compe-
tition and yields higher proﬁts when add-ons are sold only to some consumers. Proposition
2 illustrates this observation by analyzing the behavior of the standard and add-on pricing
game for a diﬀerent set of parameter values.
One assumption is that the marginal utilities of income in the two populations are more
diﬀerent (α`/αh > 3.2). In the add-on pricing game, this makes ﬁrms want to sell the
add-on to half of their customers at a price of w/αh rather than to all of them at a price
of w/α`. In the standard pricing game, ﬁrms sometimes sell good L as part of a “damaged
goods” price discrimination strategy. The restriction on the size w of the add-on plays
two roles: it simpliﬁes the algebra and implies that by adopting add-on pricing ﬁrms, have
essentially committed themselves to keeping pL and pH farther apart than they would be
in the equilibrium of the standard pricing game. This is the strategic commitment that
softens competition.












Then w > w and for w ∈ (w,w),
(a) The standard pricing game has a “discriminatory” sequential equilibrium in which the
low types buy good L from the closest ﬁrm at a price of c+1/α` and the high types buy good
H from the closest ﬁrm at a price of c + 1/αh. For some parameter values there is also a
sequential equilibrium in which all consumers buy good H from the closest ﬁrm at a price
of c + 1/α. There are no other symmetric pure-strategy equilibria.
(b) The add-on pricing game has a sequential equilibrium in which the ﬁrms set piL =
c+1/α−w/2α, low types buy good L from the closest ﬁrm, and high types pay w/αh more
to upgrade to good H. This is the only symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which the
equilibrium played at t = 2 is always that which is optimal for the ﬁrms.
The ﬁrms’ proﬁts in the equilibrium of the add-on pricing game described above are (w −
w)α`αh
4ααh greater than their proﬁts in the discriminatory equilibrium of the standard pricing
game. Proﬁts are even lower in the nondiscriminatory equilibrium of the standard pricing
game.
9Sketch of Proof
(a) When the ﬁrms choose piL = c+1/α` and piH = c+1/αh in the standard pricing game,







w < w. After some algebra one can also see that the w < w condition is suﬃcient to ensure
that low types prefer L to H. For small deviations in price it is as if the ﬁrms were playing
two separate competition-on-a-line games: one involving selling good L to low types and
one involving selling good H to high types. The standard calculations for these games show
that a small change in p1L or p1H will not increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts.
Completing the proof that this is an equilibrium requires showing that ﬁrm 1 also cannot
increase its proﬁts by selling H to members of both populations. When w is large enough
such a deviation is proﬁtable – good L is suﬃciently damaged so as to make the beneﬁts
from selling the low types a better product outweigh the price discrimination beneﬁts of
selling L. The upper bound w was chosen to ensure that a deviation that involves selling
only H is not proﬁtable. The appendix contains this calculation along with other details
of the argument above.
The appendix also shows that the nondiscriminatory equilibrium of Proposition 1 re-
mains an equilibrium for a proper subset of the parameter values covered by Proposition
2 (those with α`/αh or w large) and that there are no other symmetric pure strategy
equilibria.
(b) In the add-on pricing game the lower bound on α`/αh ensures that when p1L and p2L
are close together, the best equilibrium (for the ﬁrms) has both ﬁrms pricing the add-on at



















(p1L + w/αh − c)
Considering the ﬁrst-order conditions for ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt maximization shows that piL = c+
1/α−w/2α is the only possible ﬁrst period price in a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium.
This proﬁt function is concave, so no price p1L for which the proﬁt function applies can
increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts. It remains only to show that ﬁrm 1 cannot increase its proﬁts via
a larger deviation, for example with a larger reduction in price that will let it sell to all of
the low types (which yields a higher proﬁt than the above formula gives when p1L is below
cost). The assumption that α`/αh < 10 in the proposition is a convenient way to ensure
10that the proﬁle is indeed an equilibrium. (Weaker conditions could be given with some
more work.) Again, the details are in the appendix.




































Simplifying the diﬀerence between these two expressions gives the result on the diﬀerence
in proﬁts. The proﬁts in the nondiscriminatory equilibrium of the standard pricing game




1. The view of add-on pricing that consumers should have in light of the equilibrium
eﬀects of add-on pricing described in Propositions 1 and 2 is counter to what one often hears
from consumer groups. For example, there was great popular uproar when, in the midst of
the electricity crisis of 2001, some hotel chains started adding a ﬁxed daily energy surcharge
to every bill. Proposition 1 suggests that consumers should not dislike the practice. If all
consumers are aware of the practice it will have no eﬀect on the total bill in equilibrium.
High prices for minibar items and in-room movies are often seen as less outrageous because
consumers can avoid paying the high prices by not consuming the add-ons. Proposition 2,
however, indicates that it is precisely the voluntary nature of such consumption that leads
to higher equilibrium prices.
2. Another natural point of comparison is how prices in the add-on pricing game diﬀer
from those that would prevail if the damaged good L did not exist. In this situation,
the equilibrium price of good H would again be c + 1/α.7 Hence, the invention of good
L increases the ﬁrms’ proﬁts. An interesting further observation is that in contrast to
how we normally think about price discrimination, the invention of the damaged good and
7That this is an equilibrium and not just the solution to the ﬁrst-order conditions follows from the
analysis of the possibililty of a uniform pricing equilibrium in the standard pricing game in the appendix.
11the adoption of add-on pricing makes both types of consumers worse oﬀ. Low types pay
w
2α = w
α`+αh less in add-on pricing game than in the one-good model, but they get a good
that is w
α` less valuable to them. High types pay w
αh − w
αh+α` more in the add-on pricing
game for the same good.
3. One can get some intuition for why proﬁts increase in the add-on pricing model by
thinking about ﬁrm 1’s best response when ﬁrm 2 sets p2L = c+1/α` and p2H = c+1/αh.
In the standard pricing model, ﬁrm 1’s best response is to match these prices. In the add-on
pricing model if w/αh > 1/αh − 1/α` then it is as if ﬁrm 1 is constrained to choose prices
that are farther apart. It thus chooses p1L < p2L and p1H > p2H. Why do average prices
increase? Roughly, prices are reduced less in the small market because cutting prices to
the low types is more costly than increasing prices to the high types. Formally, the best-
response prices satisfy the ﬁrst order condition: dπ1L
dp1L(p1L) = −dπ1H
dp1H (p1H). Approximating











H(p1H)(p1H − c) + 2Q0
H(p1H)
Q00
L(p1L)(p1L − c) + 2Q0
L(p1L)
In the competition-on-a-line model, ﬁrm-level demand curves are linear, so the Q00 terms
are zero and the fact that the low types’ demand is more price-sensitive implies that p1L
is moved down from p2L less than p1H is moved up from p2H. For more general demand
curves, the calculation suggests that similar results may obtain when demand is convex or
when it concave with |Q00| not too large.
4. Good L can easily be sold at a loss in the add-on pricing model. Its price, c+ 1
α − w
2α,
is less than c whenever w > 2. The upper bound w on w in the proposition is greater than
2 when α`/αh > 7+
√
45
2 ≈ 6.85. The reason why good L is priced below cost (to attract
consumers who will buy other goods at a higher markup) is the same as in Lal and Matutes.
One diﬀerence in the outcome is that in my model, there are consumers who purchase only
the loss leader. The beneﬁt that the ﬁrms receive from having adopted the add-on pricing
policy is also diﬀerent. In Lal and Matutes not advertising one good is useful because the
ﬁrms spend less on advertising. In my model, not advertising the price of good H softens
price competition.
125. The multiplicity of equilibria in the standard pricing game is a consequence of ﬁrm
1’s best responses in the two markets being more spread out when ﬁrm 2’s prices are more
spread out. When w is not too large the key constraint on the uniform pricing equilibrium
is that ﬁrm 1 must prefer selling H to everyone to deviating and selling L to the low types
and H to the high types. The key constraint on the discriminatory equilibrium is the
exact opposite – ﬁrm 1 must prefer selling L to the low types and H to the high types to
deviating and selling H to everyone. Selling both products at prices at least w apart is
more attractive when the other ﬁrm is discriminating, and hence it is possible for the two
equilibria to coexist.
6. Something that I have not discussed in detail in the proposition is that the add-on
game will typically have a large number of equilibria with diﬀerent payoﬀ levels. The source
of the multiplicity is that the Diamond result about the monopoly price being the unique
outcome of a search model does not carry over to a model like the one given here with a
discrete set of types. In addition to the Diamond-like continuation equilibrium where the
ﬁrms both sell the upgrade at a price of w/αh, there is also often a continuation equilibrium
where consumers expect both ﬁrms to set a price of w/α` and ﬁrms set this price. Firms
cannot proﬁtably deviate from this equilibrium by raising the add-on price to w/α` + 
because this causes a discrete drop in demand. They cannot deviate by raising the add-on
price to w/αh because many of the high types would refuse to buy anything and instead go
to the other ﬁrm where they expect that the upgrade price will be lower. This multiplicity
of equilibria at t = 2 leads to additional equilibria in the whole game in a couple of ways.
First, by assuming that the ﬁrms set piU = w/α` whenever possible, one can sometimes
(but not always) resurrect the equilibrium of proposition 1 in which p∗
H = c+1/α. (Proﬁts
in the add-on pricing game are then lower than in the discriminatory equilibrium of the
standard pricing game). It does not seem completely unreasonable to imagine that this
equilibrium could prevail and that ﬁrms might sometimes miss out on an opportunity
to beneﬁt from add-on pricing because they are trapped in a lower proﬁt equilibria by
consumer expectations that add-ons will be reasonably priced. Second, one can construct
bootstrapped equilibria with higher and lower proﬁt levels by assuming that the ﬁrms set
piU = w/αh on the equilibrium path but punish each other by reverting to the equilibrium
with piU = w/α` following any deviation. These equilibria seem unreasonable.
135 Why do ﬁrms adopt add-on pricing?
The previous sections examine the impact of the joint adoption of add-on pricing. They do
not address the question of why ﬁrms adopt add-on pricing. Proﬁts are higher with add-on
pricing because it is as if ﬁrms in the model were committed to keep piH and piL farther
apart than they otherwise would be. A consequence of this is that if ﬁrms had the option of
posting both prices at t = 1, they would want to deviate from the add-on pricing strategy
and post both a higher price for good L and a lower price for good H at t = 1.
How can one account for the use of add-on pricing strategies? I list below a number of
reasons why ﬁrms might endogenously choose to only post the price of good L in a model
where ﬁrms have the option to post any number of prices at t = 1. Explanation 1 is a
multiple equilibrium story in which add-on pricing is one of many equilibria; explanation
3 identiﬁes a situation in which add-on pricing is the unique equilibrium, and the others
are somewhere in between. In many cases, the explanations can be combined, e.g. one
could argue that ﬁrms may choose not to post the price of good H because the potential
gains are oﬀset by a combination of incremental advertising costs and the desire to exploit
boundedly rational consumers. Explanation 5 works only in conjunction with one or more
of the others.
The previous sections can be seen as examining what happens when any of the root
causes mentioned in this section leads ﬁrms to choose the timing of price postings that the
add-on pricing model assumes.
1. Advertising costs determined by consumer search patterns
In many industries it would be prohibitively expensive to inform potential customers
of a product’s price via advertising. Hotels and car rental agencies, for example, serve
consumers from all over the country and sell goods at many diﬀerent prices. Avis would
be crazy to conduct a nationonwide media campaign to tell a few potential consumers that
the rate for a three-day rental of a Pontiac Grand Am at the Detroit airport on August 2,
2002 is $74.97. Instead, consumers learn about prices by actively looking for prices that
ﬁrms have posted.
Firms can only cheaply inform consumers of prices that the consumers are looking for.
If ﬁrms are known to use add-on pricing policies, consumers may only look for the prices of
14low-quality goods. Each of the main internet travel websites, for example, is only designed
to let consumers search for the base price for a rental, not for the price of a rental including
insurance, prepaid gasoline, and other add-on charges.
If most consumers only look for prices for good L, add-on pricing will be individually
rational. Cutting the price of good H lowers the ﬁrm’s margin on all good H sales and
does nothing to attract consumers who only look for good L prices.
2. Tacit collusion
The main conclusion of Section 4 was that the joint adoption of add-on pricing policies
increases proﬁts. This makes it attractive to tacitly collude on using an add-on strategy.
To complete this story, one would want to explain why ﬁrms only collude on using add-on
pricing rather than colluding on price. Colluding on price would be more proﬁtable, so this
presumably requires arguing that colluding on using add-on pricing is easier than colluding
on price. Colluding on price can be diﬃcult for many reasons: ﬁrms need to coordinate on
changing prices in response to cost or demand shocks; ﬁrms may prefer diﬀerent prices; and
monitoring deviations from optimal pricing may be diﬃcult if (as presumably happens with
hotels, rental cars, etc.) the optimal pricing policy involves dynamically changing prices in
response to privately known cost shocks and capacity constraints. A tacit agreement to use
add-on pricing avoids all of the complexity, coordination, and monitoring issues: the ﬁrms
just need to agree to and monitor that no one is advertising the price of good H.
To make this story more convincing, one would also want to argue not just that full
collusion is impossible, but also that there aren’t easy strategies for colluding on prices that
are less than fully collusive but still are more proﬁtable than the equilibrium prices in the
add-on pricing game. See Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2003) for a discussion of partially
collusive pricing schemes in a model where ﬁrms have private information.
3. Exploitation of boundedly rational consumers
I mentioned earlier that the add-on pricing model can be given a “behavioral” interpre-
tation: some or all of the high types could be unsophisticated consumers who are not as
good at making price comparisons across ﬁrms and who are also easier to talk into buying
add-ons at the point-of-sale. For example, they might be people who eat the jar of nuts
sitting next to the minibar without realizing that it is part of the minibar and costs $8
15or people who think that they will pay their credit card bills on time and don’t pay much
attention to the late-payment fee when choosing a card even though they will likely end up
making several payments late.
One reason why ﬁrms adopt add-on pricing policies may be that they somehow “trick”
unsophisticated consumers into paying more than they would if the ﬁrms fully informed
consumers about prices. For example, it seems plausible that some customers who are
attracted by an advertisement for a $99.95 weekly car rental and then agree to pay an
extra $91 over the course of week for insurance might have made other arrangements if the
advertisement had listed both prices and made them think about how much the insurance
would cost.
Add-on pricing can easily be individually rational for the ﬁrms if a fraction of the
high types are unsophisticated consumers. The potential gain from selling to additional
sophisticated high types at a lower price could be more than oﬀset by losses that would
result from not tricking the unsophisticated ones.
4. Per-product advertising costs
As in Lal and Matutes (1994), one could argue that it is sometimes more costly to
advertise the prices of two products than the price of one product. If the incremental cost
of advertising a second price is greater than the amount that a ﬁrm can gain by choosing a
somewhat lower price for good H and a somewhat higher price for good L, then it will be
individually rational for the ﬁrms to advertise just one price.
To make this a complete explanation for add-on pricing, one must also argue that ﬁrms
cannot proﬁtably deviate by posting a price for good H instead of a price for good L. If a
ﬁrm only posts a price for good H at t = 1, then it will only sell good H in equilibrium.
(The ﬁrm cannot set a price for good L that makes positive sales because the ﬁrm will
always want to deviate and increase its good L price slightly given the search costs.) If
ﬁrm 1 deviates from the add-on pricing equilibrium and sells good H to both populations,







































This expression is maximized at p1H = c + 1/α + w/4α with the maximized value being
16(1 + w/4)2/α. For the parameter values considered in Proposition 2, this is less than the
equilibrium proﬁt, and hence suﬃciently high per-product advertising costs will justify the
add-on pricing equilibrium. The prices given in Proposition 2 are an equilibrium of the
add-on pricing game for a larger set of parameter values than is covered by the hypotheses
of the proposition. For some of these (e.g. when w is very large) the prices would fail to
be an equilibrium of the game where ﬁrms can choose which price to advertise because the
ﬁrms would want to deviate and advertise good H instead.
5. The diﬃculty of undercutting a nonposted price
Another factor that can be combined with any of the explanations above is that un-
dercutting a high add-on price is more diﬃcult than undercutting a high posted price or
undercutting a high nonposted price in a single good model like Diamond’s. The problem is
that posting a lower price for good H may lead a ﬁrm’s rival to also choose a lower add-on
price (and consumers will anticipate this).
Consider, for example, the add-on pricing model with α`/αh = 3 and w = 10/3. The
equilibrium has both ﬁrms set p∗
L = c − 1/α` and p∗
H = c + 3/αh. If ﬁrm 2 was committed
to these prices and ﬁrm 1 was capable of posting two prices at t = 1, its optimal deviation
would be to dump all the unproﬁtable low types on the other ﬁrm and steal all of the
high types by setting p1L ≥ c and p1H = c + 2/αh. In a one-good model, advertising a
lower price and capturing the whole market is not diﬃcult – we can construct such an
equilibrium by assuming that consumers rationally believe that the ﬁrm which has been
undercut continues to charge the monopoly price (and receives no visitors). This, however,
is not possible in the add-on pricing model. If ﬁrm 1 makes the deviation described above,
ﬁrm 2 would be visited by low types and only low types. Hence, it is not an equilibrium
for ﬁrm 2 to continue to choose a high price for the add-on at t = 2. Instead the only
equilibrium of the continuation game is for ﬁrm 2 to set p2H = p2L + w/α`. At this price,
ﬁrm 2 sells to all of the low types and all of the high types, and ﬁrm 1 ends up with zero
proﬁts.
The extremely low proﬁt resulting from this one poorly thought out deviation does
not indicate that there is no proﬁtable deviation from the proﬁle above. Firm 1 simply
needs to make a smaller deviation and be sure to leave its rival with enough high types so
17that it remains an equilibrium for ﬁrm 2 to choose a high add-on price at t = 2. (In this
case it must ensure that q2H ≥ q2L/2.) This is not a problem for very small deviations,
so ﬁrm 1 will always have a proﬁtable deviation if there are no advertising costs. It is,
however, an additional constraint that one must impose in computing the proﬁts from the
optimal deviation. In conjunction with per-product advertising costs or some other factor,
the diﬃculty of undercutting a nonposted price may thus be thought of as another reason
why posting only the good L price at t = 1 may be individually rational.
6 The cheapskate externality
How do cheapskates aﬀect markets? The question may be current interest given that the
internet makes it much easier for cheapskates to ﬁnd and exploit small price diﬀerences. The
standard answer would be that cheapskates play an important role in keeping prices near
cost. Frankel (1998), for example, proposes that the desire to live where budget-conscious
consumers keep prices low may be one reason why wealthy and poor households are often
found in close proximity in the U.S. In this section, I note that the traditional view of
cheapskates is turned on its head in the add-on pricing model.
The model of this section is a slight variant of the previous add-on pricing model that I
will refer to as the “cheapskate model”. The only diﬀerences are that I assume that there
is only an  mass of cheapskates (rather than a unit mass) and that I will focus on what
happens when α` is much larger than αh.
Propositions 1 and 2 each contrast the outcome of the standard pricing game with the
outcome of the add-on pricing game. Proposition 3 contrasts the outcome of the cheapskate
version of the add-on pricing game with what would happen if ﬁrms were selling a single
good to the same population. Part (a) illustrates that the ordinary intuition about the
eﬀects of cheapskates on other consumers and on ﬁrms is borne out in a one-good model,
which can be obtained as a special case of the cheapskate model by assuming that w = 0.
Part (b) notes that the ordinary comparative statics are reversed in the cheapskate model
when w is large enough to act as a constraint forcing ﬁrms to keep prices for good L and
H apart.8 One can thus think of add-on pricing as a practice that ﬁrms can adopt to turn
8As in Proposition 2 the requirement is that the upgrade price w/αh be larger than what the diﬀerence
18the presence of cheapskates from a curse into a blessing. At the same time the presence of
cheapskates reduces the utility of normal consumers.
The intuition for the contrast is that whereas ﬁrms in the one-good model are tempted
to slightly undercut each other to attract cheapskates, ﬁrms in the add-on pricing model
are tempted to slightly overcut each other. When w is large, ﬁrms are losing money on the
cheapskates and would like to dump all of their cheapskate customers on the other ﬁrm.
When w is not quite so large, the ﬁrms earn postive proﬁts on the cheapskates. However,
if they were to leave the high price unchanged and sell L at c + 1/αh − w/αh, they would
be selling L for less than c + 1/α` and hence would prefer to serve fewer cheapskates at a
higher margin.
Proposition 3 Suppose α`/αh > 2. Deﬁne α ≡ αh+α`
1+ .
(a) In the one-good version of the cheapskate model obtained by setting w = 0, for suﬃ-
ciently small  the unique symmetric equilibrium has p∗ = c + 1/α, and prices and proﬁts
are decreasing in .
(b) If w > w (as deﬁned in Proposition 2), then for suﬃciently small  the unique symmetric
equilibrium of the cheapskate version of the add-on pricing model has
p∗


















and proﬁts and the price paid by high types are increasing in .
Proof











The ﬁrst order condition for maximizing this implies that the only possible symmetric pure
strategy equilibrium is p∗ = c+1/α. To verify that this is indeed an equilibrium one must
also check that ﬁrm 1 cannot proﬁtably deviate to a higher price at which it serves no low
types. The price that maximizes ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts from sales to high types is p1 = c+ 1
2α+ 1
2αh.







. One can show that this
is less than the equilibrium proﬁt level for suﬃciently small  by evaluating the derivatives
between pH and pL would be if the ﬁrms competed separately for the low and high types.
19of this expression and the expression for the equilibrium proﬁts with respect to  at  = 0.
Intuitively, if the ﬁrm abandons the low market it gives up a potential proﬁt that is ﬁrst-
order in , while the proﬁts that a ﬁrm sacriﬁces in the high market when it also serves the
low types are second-order in  by the envelope theorem (because the price is approaching
the optimal price in the high submarket).
The expression for the equilibrium price is clearly decreasing in . Equilibrium proﬁts
are given by
(1+)2
αh+α`. Evaluating the derivative of this expression with respect to  at  = 0 it
is immediately evident that proﬁts are decreasing in  a neighborhood of  = 0 if α` > 2αh.
(b) Let p∗
L be the price set at t = 1 in a pure strategy equilibrium. When  is suﬃciently
small both ﬁrms will set piH = piL + w/αh at t = 2 whenever the ﬁrst period prices are in
some neighborhood of p∗
L. Hence, if ﬁrm 1 deviates to a price in a neighborhood of p∗
L its






















The fact that any equilibrium price p∗
L must be a solution to the ﬁrst order condition for
maximizing this expression gives that the only possible equilibrium is to have p∗
L equal to
w/αh less than the expression given in the statement of the proposition. The expression
for p∗





























The coeﬃcient on  in this expression is positive when w = αh(1/αh − 1/α`), and the
coeﬃcient is increasing in w. Hence, for all w satisfying the hypothesis of part (b), proﬁts
are increasing in  when  is small.
To complete the proof of part (b), it remains only to show that the prices derived above
are an equilibrium and not just the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition. Deviating to a
higher price cannot be proﬁtable. The concave proﬁt function above applies as long as sales
to the low types are nonzero. Hence ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts decline as it raises its price from p∗
L to
p∗
L +1/α`. Any price increases beyond that point would further decrease proﬁts as proﬁts,
since proﬁts from sales to the high types are decreasing in p1L at p∗
L and all higher prices.
No deviation to a lower price will be proﬁtable if ﬁrm 1 makes positive sales to the low
20types at the price which maximizes its proﬁts on sales to the high types (by the concavity
of the proﬁt function). The diﬀerence between p∗
H and the price that maximizes proﬁts
from sales to the high types (setting p1H = 1
2(p∗
H + c + 1/αh)) is of order . Hence for 




I see Holton (1957) as the seminal paper on loss-leaders in multigood settings. It notes
that “The margin sacriﬁced on the loss leader is, of course, a promotion expense incurred
to boost the sales of the other products of the store” and argues that high margins on the
“other” products can be rationalized because “the supermarket enjoys a spatial monopoly
on that item once the consumer is in the store.”9 Holton, of course, was writing before the
advent of modern oligopoly theory and could not address the impact of loss-leader tactics
on equilibrium prices and proﬁts. The modern IO literature has also not identiﬁed the
eﬀect of loss leader pricing on equilibrium proﬁts highlighted in this paper.
Most closely related are two papers that have used similar models to explain why loss
leaders can be sold at a loss and why high quality products are sold at higher markups.
The ﬁrst of these, Lal and Matutes (1994), is the starting point for this paper – two ﬁrms
each sell two goods to a continuum of consumers located along a Hotelling line. Firms
advertise one product as a loss leader and recoup the losses by holding consumers up for
their reservation value on the unadvertised product. Lal and Matutes do emphasize that
loss-leader pricing increases proﬁts, but this occurs only because loss leaders allow ﬁrms
to economize on per-product advertising costs. Apart from advertising cost savings ,their
model is one in which add-on pricing is irrelevant.
The second, Verboven (1999), focuses on why premium quality products have higher
markups. The reason he proposes is exactly the same as in Lal and Matutes – he assumes
that there is a Diamond-like search game in the second stage that results in ﬁrms charging
the monopoly price for the add-on. His paper diﬀers from Lal and Matutes in the functional
9The emphasis is in the original. See pages 21 and 27 of Holton (1957).
21forms on preferences: the horizontal taste preferences are logit rather than uniform; and he
also assumes that consumers are vertically diﬀerentiated with the marginal value of quality
being uniformly distributed. The vertical diﬀerentiation means that some consumers will
beneﬁt from add-on pricing and some will be hurt. The ﬁrms, however, remain exactly
indiﬀerent. A crucial diﬀerence between Verboven’s model and the model of this paper is
that Verboven’s vertical heterogeneity is in the marginal valuation of quality, rather than
the marginal utility of income. Hence, price cuts attract low- and high- types equally, rather
than disproportionately attracting customers who will refuse to buy the add-on.
Simester (1995) and Lazear (1995) provide less related models of similar tactics. Simester
(1995) provides a signalling explanation for loss leaders. The model has two retailers lo-
cated at the opposite ends of a Hotelling line selling two products each. Firms have private
information about their per unit retailing costs and can advertise only one product. Firms
with lower costs set lower prices for the unadvertised goods. Prices for advertised goods
may be distorted downward to signal that a ﬁrm’s unadvertised goods have low prices.
Lazear (1995) is a monopoly model of bait-and-switch advertising. The ﬁrm has available
for sale only one of the two potential products A and B. Customers have heterogeneous
preferences for A and B and incur a transporation cost in visiting the ﬁrm. One might
think that ﬁrms would always advertise their price for the product they have in stock.
Lazear notes, however, that sometimes there is instead or in addition a pooling equilibrium
where all ﬁrms advertise B regardless of what they have in stock. This occurs when an
advertisement for B would attract a large number of consumers who are unwilling to pay
the transporation cost to get the opportunity to buy A, but who may be willing to buy A
once they are at the store and the cost is sunk.
Hess and Gerstner (1987) examines a motivation to stock out on advertised products and
oﬀer rain checks. The model involves Bertrand competition between retailers selling two
products: a primary product which consumers purchase once from the store that has the
best combination of a low price and a high likelihood of having the product in stock; and an
“impulse good” that consumers purchase every week without shopping around. Firms oﬀer
some rain checks in equilibrium because issuing a rain check guarantees that the consumer
will return the following week and make his impulse purchase from the same store. With
Bertrand competition, the proﬁts from the subsequent visit are returned to consumers in
22lower prices for the primary good. In equilibrium all ﬁrms adopt the rain-check strategy
and proﬁts are lower than if rain checks were banned.
The literature on competitive price discrimination has asked some related questions.
Holmes (1989) examines banning price discrimination when duopolists compete in two
separate markets. While monopolists are always hurt by restrictions on prices, duopolists
need not be. Banning price discrimination lowers prices in one market and raises them
in the other; the net eﬀect on proﬁts is ambiguous. Corts (1997) examines two vertically
diﬀerentiated ﬁrms selling one product each. There are two groups of consumers: one values
quality and one does not (and hence considers products undiﬀerentiated). He ﬁnds that
banning price discrimination may increase prices in both markets. One could think of this
conclusion as the exact opposite of remark 2 in Section 4, but the models and mechanisms
are mostly unrelated so this is probably not enlightening. Lal and Matutes (1989) examines
a model more similar to that of this paper (without unadvertised prices), but the ideas it
develops are not closely related. It shows that despite the perfect information, ﬁrms may
achieve the fully collusive proﬁt in an asymmetric equilibrium.
This paper can also be thought of as related to any paper discussing a strategic invest-
ment that softens competition. Chapter 8 of Tirole (1988) reviews a number of such papers.
A classic example is Thisse and Vives (1988), which notes that ﬁrms are better oﬀ com-
peting in FOB prices than in delivered prices, because when they choose separate delivered
prices for each location they end up being in Bertrand competition for the consumers at
each location. As in this paper, they also note that FOB pricing is not individually rational
in an extended game in which ﬁrms ﬁrst choose pricing policies, and then compete in prices.
This paper as contributing to these literatures in a few ways: it analyzes a structure of
consumer preferences that seems more realistic for some applications; it reaches a diﬀerent
conclusion on the price and welfare eﬀects of add-on pricing strategies; its contribution
to the price discrimination literature is to examine a competitive model of second-degree
discrimination; and it notes that the constraint that ﬁrms must hold consumers up for the
full value of unadvertised add-ons softens competition.
The one very closely related empirical paper is Ellison and Ellison (2002), which analyzes
demand and markups at a retailer using an add-on strategy when selling computer parts
on the internet. Its provides evidence in support of this paper in two ways: it provides
23evidence that this paper’s assumptions about demand reﬂect reality in at least one market;
and it provides evidence in support of this paper’s conclusions. The evidence relevant to
the assumptions are estimates of how the demand for products of several quality levels
depends on the prices of all of the other qualities. Speciﬁcally, loss leaders are shown to
attract a large number of customers who end up buying upgraded products at higher price,
and there is evidence of the adverse selection eﬀect – the customer pool of attracted by a
low-priced loss leader is shown to have a much higher percentage of customers who do not
upgrade. Supporting evidence for the conclusion that add-on pricing softens competition
comes from a straightforward analysis of price and cost data. The ﬁrm is estimated to
earn average markups over marginal cost of 10 to 15 percent even though the elasticity of
demand for the base good is about -40.
There is surprisingly little other empirical evidence on loss-leader pricing. The one
standard empirical reference in marketing seems to be Walters (1988). It examines the
impact of loss leaders on store traﬃc by estimating a system of simultaneous equations.
The key equation essentially regresses the total number of customers visiting a supermarket
in a week on dummy variables for whether a product in each of eight categories is featured
in a sales circular and oﬀered at a discount of at least 15%. Walters ﬁnds little evidence
that loss leaders aﬀect store traﬃc. Chevalier, Rossi, and Scharfstein (2003) use data
from a Chicago supermarket chain to examine the pricing and demand for products that
have large seasonal peaks in demand. Several ﬁndings are consistent with these products
serving as loss leaders: the retail margin of a product tends to decline during the period
of its peak demand even if this does not coincide with a peak in aggregate supermarket
demand; aggregate margins do not decrease during aggregate demand peaks; reductions in
item prices during product-speciﬁc demand peaks do not appear to be due to changes in
demand elasticities; and reductions in item prices during product-speciﬁc demand peaks are
associated with increases in product-speciﬁc advertising. Verboven (1999) uses a hedonic
regression to compare markups for base model cars and cars with more powerful engines
and ﬁnds that percentage markups on the premium engines are higher in some car classes
but not in others.
248 Conclusion
The add-on pricing strategy described in this paper could be practiced in almost any busi-
ness. Firms just need to be able to invent a lower-quality versions of their products; the
lower-quality products need not be any cheaper to produce. The key feature of the con-
sumer pool is that consumers who are more sensitive to inter-ﬁrm price diﬀerences are
less likely to purchase costly add-ons. This seems plausible given a number of sources of
heterogeneity, e.g. rich versus poor consumers, individual versus business customers, or
sophisticated versus unsophisticated shoppers.
The general idea of creating intentionally creating an adverse selection problem to limit
competition is perhaps also one that could be applied in contexts other than pricing games.
For ﬁrms the main consequence of add-on pricing is that proﬁts are higher than they
otherwise would be given the degree of product diﬀerentiation. This eﬀect may be generally
important to our understanding of how ﬁrms maintain suﬃcient markups to survive in a
world where ﬁxed costs are often substantial. In the long run, of course, entry would be
expected to reduce the degree of diﬀerentiation between adjacent ﬁrms and bring proﬁts
into line with ﬁxed costs. What add-on pricing may help us understand is thus why we
observe so many ﬁrms in various industries.
I have not discussed social welfare. Models with unit demands are poorly suited to
welfare analyses. For example, social welfare in the add-on pricing model is identical to
that in the discriminatory equilibrium of the standard pricing model – in both models all
low types by one unit of L and all high types buy one unit of H. In a more realistic
setup, the lower price for good L would increase consumption of L and the higher price
for the add-on would reduce consumption of H. How the losses and gains would trade oﬀ
is not clear. The welfare comparison between the add-on pricing model and the one-good
model obtained by eliminating good L may be more straightforward. I noted that both the
high and low types pay more relative to their valuation in the add-on pricing game than
in the one-good model. If this is also true in a model with continuous aggregate demand
functions, deadweight loss would presumably be unambiguously larger in the add-on model.
(Welfare is unambiuously lower in the add-on pricing game with unit demands because it
is ineﬃcient for the low types to buy L rather than H.)
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27Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(a) Consider ﬁrst the possibility of a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium where all
consumers buy good H at a price of p∗
H. This requires that piL ≥ p∗
H − w/α`. If ﬁrm 1
deviates to a price p1H in a neighborhood of p∗
H (and raises p1L at the same time if need










A necessary condition for Nash equilibrium is that the derivative of this expression be
zero at p1H = p∗








, which implies that the only possible
equilibrium of this form is p1H = p2H = p∗
H = c + 1/α.
To show that it is indeed a SPE for both ﬁrms to set piH = c + 1/α and piL ≥
c+1/α−w/α` (with all consumers buying good H from the closest ﬁrm) requires that we
check that various possible deviations do not increase a ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
Consider ﬁrst a deviation to prices p1L and p1H at which consumers only buy good H.
To show that such a deviation cannot increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts I’ll make a few observations
in succession.
Observation 1: If ﬁrm 1 sells good H to some but not all consumers in each population
then the deviation does not increase proﬁts.
To see this, note that in this case the formula above gives ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts. The expression
is a quadratic in p1H and hence the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition is the maximum.
Observation 2: If ﬁrm 1 sells good H to everyone in the cheapskate population then the
deviation does not increase proﬁts.
With such prices, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts are smaller than what one gets from plugging p1H into
the proﬁt formula above, which in turn is smaller than the proﬁts from setting p1H = p∗
H.
Observation 3: If ﬁrm 1 makes no sales in the cheapskate population then the deviation is
not proﬁtable.
If ﬁrm 1 chooses p1H > p∗













28Taking the ﬁrst order condition we see that the global maximum of this expression occurs
at





















A straightforward calculation shows that this is the case if α`/αh ≤ (3 +
√
17)/2 ≈ 3.562,
which is true given the assumption of the Proposition. Hence, we can conclude that the
proﬁts from any price that sells only to the high types are at most equal to the proﬁts
received from the high types by setting p1H = c + 1
2αh + 1
2α, which in turn is less than the
proﬁts received from setting this price and selling to members of both populations, which
by observation 1 are less than what ﬁrm 1 receives by setting p1H = p∗
H.
Taken together, observations 1-3 imply that any deviation which involves only selling
good H is not proﬁtable: if ﬁrm 1 deviates to p1H < p∗
H then ﬁrm 1 makes more sales to
cheapskates than to high types so either observation 1 or observation 2 applies; if ﬁrm 1
deviates to p1H > p∗
H then ﬁrm 1 makes more sales to high types than to cheapskates and
observation 1 or observation 3 applies.
Observation 4: Any deviation to prices p1L and p1H at which ﬁrm 1 sells only good L is
not proﬁtable.
To see this, note that ﬁrm 1 would sell at least as many units (and get a higher price
on each at no higher cost) by setting prices p0
1L = ∞ and p0
1H = p1L+w/α`. We’ve already
shown these prices do not increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt.
Finally, consider a deviation to prices p1L and p1H at which ﬁrm 1 sells good L to the
cheapskates and good H to the high types. If there were no IC constraints so ﬁrm 1 could
simply choose the optimal prices in each population its choices would be p1H = c+ 1
2α + 1
2αh
and p1L = c + 1
2α + 1−w
2α` . If w < α`−αh
2α`−αh, however, these prices would lead the high types
to buy good L. If w > α`−αh
αh , these prices would lead the low types to buy good H.
Accordingly, I will consider separately the optimal deviation of this form when w is small
(with the high type’s IC constrait binds), intermediate, and high (with the low type’s IC
constraint binding). I do this by presenting an additional series of observations.
29Observation 5: If w ≤ α`−αh
2α`−αh then a deviation that sells L to the low types and H to
the high types is not proﬁtable.




































1(w) = maxp1H π1(p1H,w) and write p∗
1H for the price that maximizes this expression.
The maximum proﬁt achievable by a deviation of this form is at most πd
1(w) as long as the
best possible deviation of this form has p1H −w/αh ≥ c. (In the opposite case the deviation
can’t increase proﬁts because ﬁrm 1 would be better oﬀ not selling good L and we have
already seen that such deviations do not increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts.) From the envelope





















To show that πd





it suﬃces to show that the derivative is
negative for all w in the interval. For this it suﬃces to show that
(2α` − αh)(p∗
1H(w) − c) < 1 + α`/α.
If the high type’s IC constraint were not binding ﬁrm 1 would choose p1H = c + 1
2α + 1
2αh.
Given the constraint the optimal p∗
1H(w) will be smaller. Plugging this upper bound into












Mulitplying through and collecting terms this is equivalent to
2α2
` − α`αh − 5α2
h < 0,
which holds provided that α`/αh < (1 +
√
41)/4 ≈ 1.851.
Observation 6: If α`−αh
2α`−αh ≤ w ≤ α`−αh
αh then a deviation that sells L to the low types
and H to the high types is not proﬁtable.
In this case, the IC constraints are not binding and the optimal deviation of this form
is to p1L = c+ 1
2α + 1−w
2α` and p1H = c+ 1
2α + 1
2αh. With these prices proﬁts from high type
consumers are independent of w and proﬁts from low type consumers are decreasing in w.
30To see that the deviation is not proﬁtable for any w in the interval it therefore suﬃces to
show that the deviation is not proﬁtable when w = α`−αh
2α`−αh. This follows from observation
5.
Observation 7: If α`−αh
αh ≤ w then a deviation that sells L to the low types and H to
the high types is not proﬁtable.
In this case, the IC constraint of the low type is binding. The optimal deviation of
this type has p1L = p1H − w/α`. This can not increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts, because the type L
consumers would also be willing to buy good H at price p1H. Hence, ﬁrm 1 could do better
selling only good H and we have already seen that there is no proﬁtable deviation of this
form.
This concludes the argument to show that there are subgame perfect equilibria with
p2H = p2H = c + 1/α, piL > c + 1/α − w/α` and all consumers buying H from the closest
ﬁrm at t = 3.
To prove the uniqueness claim of part (a), we must also show that there are no other
symmetric pure strategy equilibria in the standard pricing game. It is obvious that there
are no equilibria in which all consumers buy good L. A ﬁrm could increase its proﬁts by
setting p0
1L = ∞ and p0
iH = min(c,piL+w/α`). There are no equilibria where the low types
buy good H and high types buy good L because the high types will strictly prefer to buy
H whenever the low types weakly prefer H.
The ﬁnal more serious possibility to consider is whether there is an equilibrium in which
low types buy good L and high types buy good H. We can think of three possible cases:
equilibria where low types and high types both strictly prefer to purchase the good they
are purchasing, those where the high types are indiﬀerent to buying good L, and those
where the low types are indiﬀerent to buying good H. The last of the three cases is not
possible — each ﬁrm could increase its proﬁts by not oﬀering good L (because its low type
consumers would buy H instead at the higher price). I will ﬁrst discuss the ﬁrst case.
In a discriminatory equilibrium where low types strictly prefer good L and high types
strictly prefer good H the ﬁrst order conditions for each ﬁrm’s proﬁts imply that the only
possible equilibrium is p1L = p2L = c + 1/α` and p1H = p2H = c + 1/αh. Low types prefer
good L at these prices only if piL < piH −w/α`. This requires w ≤ α`−αh
αh . High types prefer
good H at these prices only if piL > piH −w/αh. This requires w ≥ α`−αh
α` . Assume that w
31does satisfy these conditions.
Suppose that ﬁrm 1 deviates to p0
1L = ∞ and p0
1H = c + 1
α + w
4α. One can verify that
p0
1H > p2H−1/αh and p0
1H > p2L+w/α`−1/α` whenever α`/αh < (3+
√
17)/2. Hence, after
the deviation ﬁrm 1 sells to a subset of each population and ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts are bounded
below by the standard expression for proﬁts in a competition-on-a-line model. Omitting





















































































The ﬁnal analysis necessary to complete the proof of part (a) is a demonstration that
there are also no discriminatory equilibria with piL = piH − w/αh with the parameter
restrictions of part (a). Firm 1 could deviate from such an equilibrium by raising or lowering
p1L and changing p1H by exactly the same amount (i.e., setting p1H = p1L + w/αh). For a
small enough change in prices ﬁrm 1 would continue to sell L to a fraction of the low types



















(p1L + w/αh − c).
Considering the ﬁrst order condition for maximizing this expression we can see that the
only possible SPE of this form would have p1L = c + 1/α − w/2α (and p1H = c + 1/α −
32w/2α+w/αh.) Given the restriction on α`/αh in the proposition it turns out that there is
always a proﬁtable deviation from this proﬁle.
If w > (α`−αh)/α` a proﬁtable deviation is to raise p1L by a small amount and leave p1H
unchanged. With such a deviation proﬁts from sales to the high types will be unchanged
and ﬁrm 1 will sell fewer units of good L to low types (at a higher price). This is proﬁtable
























which is positive for w > (α` − αh)/α`.
When w ≤ (α` −αh)/α` a proﬁtable deviation is to simply raise p1L suﬃciently high so
that the low types will prefer to buy good H. Firm 1 will sell fewer units with this strategy,
but at a higher price. Proﬁts from the high types are unchanged. Proﬁts from sales to the
low types change from 1





































Substituting in the upper bound (α` − αh)/α` for the second w in this expression and







which is positive for α`/αh < 2. This completes the proof that there is no equilibrium in
which the ﬁrms make sales of good L and thereby completes the proof of part (a) of the
proposition.
(b) To analyze the add-on pricing game , I begin with a lemma noting that if the ﬁrms’
ﬁrst period prices are close together, then at t = 2 the ﬁrms will sell the “upgrade” to all
consumers at a price of w/α`.
33Lemma 1 Assume α`/αh ≤ 1.6. Suppose that at t = 1 the ﬁrms choose prices p1L and p2L
with |p2L−p1L| ≤ 2αh−α`
α2
h
and c < piL < (v−w−s−1/2)/α`. Then, the unique equilibrium
of the subgame at t = 2 has the ﬁrms selling the upgrade to all consumers at a price of
w/α`.
A proof of the lemma is presented immediately after the proof of this Proposition. Given
the result of the lemma, we know that ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt following a small deviation at t = 1
from the symmetric proﬁle p1L = p2L = p∗




















Considering the ﬁrst order condition for maximizing this expression shows that the only
possible ﬁrst period price in a symmetric SPE is p∗
L = c + 1/α − w/α`. By Lemma 1, at
t=2 both ﬁrms must set piH = c + 1/α − w/α` + w/α` = c + 1/α on the equilibrium path,
and all consumers must buy good H from the nearest ﬁrm. This completes the proof of
the uniqueness part of part (b) of the proposition.
To verify that there is indeed a pure strategy SPE of the form described, suppose that
both ﬁrms set piL = c + 1/α − w/α` at t = 1 and follow some SPE strategy at t = 2 and
that consumers behave optimally given the ﬁrms’ equilibrium strategies and purchase good
H if they are indiﬀerent between buying H and L.
By deﬁnition we know that ﬁrm 1 has no proﬁtable deviation at t = 2.
To show that there is no proﬁtable deviation at t = 1, I will present a series of observa-
tions covering various cases.






With such a deviation, Lemma 1 implies that ﬁrm 2 sets p2H = c + 1/α at t = 2. Part
(a) of the proposition implies that no matter what prices p1L and p1H ﬁrm 1 chooses it
cannot earn a proﬁt in excess of 1/α when p2H = c + 1/α. This includes the prices ﬁrm 1
is charging after a deviation here.






In this case, regardless of what prices are chosen at t = 2 ﬁrm 1 will sell at least as
many units of good L as of good H. Hence, its proﬁts are bounded above by the proﬁts
34from selling the same number of units at a price of p1L + w/α`. If p1L + w/α` < 0 then
these proﬁts are negative and not a proﬁtable deviation. If p1L + w/α` > 0 then proﬁts
are bounded above by the proﬁts ﬁrm 1 would receive from selling to all consumers at this














































In this case, ﬁrm 2 will make at least as many sales to low types as to high types. Hence,
p2H = p2L +w/α` = c+1/α. Again, part (a) of the proposition implies that the prices p1L
and p1H ﬁrm 1 ends up charging cannot increase its proﬁts.
QED
Proof of Lemma 1 To see that p1U = p2U = w/α` is an equilibrium, note that when the
ﬁrms are expected to set the same upgrade price, the mass of group j customers visiting
ﬁrm 1 is 1
2 +
αj












(p1L − c + w/α`).
Deviating to a lower upgrade price obviously cannot increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts – the lower
price will not lead to any extra sales.





2 (p2L − p1L)

w
α`. Firm 1’s sales to high types will be no higher.
The upgrade price paid by these customers can be at most w/αh. Hence the increase in










. The change in
























































35The bound on |p2L − p1L| assumed in the lemma ensures that this is negative.
I now show that this is the only equilibrium.
First, note that the upper bound on the prices for L ensures that all consumers will
visit one of the ﬁrms in equilibrium.
Next, note that in any equilibrium all ﬁrms choose piU equal to either w/αh or wα`. To
see this, one ﬁrst shows that both ﬁrms must set piU ≥ w/α`. Otherwise, the ﬁrm with the
lower price attracts a positive mass of consumers. All of these consumers receive weakly
higher ex ante expected utility from visiting that ﬁrm. Once they have sunk s visiting that
ﬁrm they strictly prefer to buy there at the equilibrium prices. If the ﬁrm raises its upgrade
price by some amount less than s/α` and keeps its price less than w/α` it will lose no sales.
This would be a proﬁtable deviation. The fact that piU ≥ w/α` implies that consumers
in the low group get no surplus from buying the upgrade. Because of this and because
the diﬀerence in prices for L is assumed to be bounded above by (2αh − α`)/α2
h, which is
less than 1/α`, each ﬁrm attracts a positive mass of consumers in any equilibrium. There
cannot be an equilibrium with w/α` < piU < w/αh because ﬁrm i would gain by raising
its price slightly (if it is making any sales of good H) or by dropping its price to w/α` (if
not). There cannot be an equilibrium with piU > w/αh because ﬁrm i will sell no units of
H, but would make positive sales by dropping its price to w/α`.
There cannot be an equilibrium with p1U = p2U = w/αh because then the mass of
customers from each group visiting ﬁrm 1 is exactly the same as when p1U = p2U = w/α`.
The calculation above thus implies that ﬁrm 1 would increases its proﬁts by deviating to
p1U = w/α`. To see that there can not be an equilibrium with p1U = w/αh and p2U = w/α`
note that in this case the mass of low-type consumers visiting ﬁrm 1 would be exactly the
same as in the above calculations, but that ﬁrm 1 would be visited by fewer high types.
This makes the gain from deviating to p1U = w/α` even greater.
QED
Proof of Proposition 2
The result that w > w follows from simple algebra:







⇐⇒ 4(α` + αh)2α2
` > α`αh(5α` − αh)2
36⇐⇒ α`(α` − αh)(4α2
` − 13α`αh + αh) > 0.





Another fact that will come in handy is that w < α`−αh
αh . To see this, one can carry out
a calculation similar to that above to show that
α` − αh
αh
> w ⇐⇒ αh(α` − αh)(α2
` + 3α`αh + 4αh) > 0.
(a) To show that the strategy proﬁle where both ﬁrms set piL = p∗
L ≡ c + 1/α` and piH =
p∗
H ≡ c+1/αh is a sequential equilibrium (when combined with optimal behavior on the part
of consumers) note ﬁrst that the restrictions on w imply that when consumers anticipate
that piL = p∗
L and piH = p∗
H then all consumers will visit the closest ﬁrm, low types will
buy good L and high types will buy good H. (This follows from αh(piH − piL) = w < w
and α`(piH − piL) = (α` − αh)/αh > w > w). Hence, if the ﬁrms follow the given strategy
proﬁle each earns a proﬁt of 1
2α` + 1
2αh.
If ﬁrm 1 deviates to any prices p1L and p1H at which it sells L to low types and H to






















This is a concave function uniquely maximized at p1L = 1
2(c + p∗
L + 1/α`) = c + 1/α` and
p1H = c + 1/αh, so the deviation does not increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts.
If ﬁrm 1 sells L to low types and H to high types and sells to no or all customers in
one (or both) markets then it is strictly worse oﬀ: zero sales earn zero rather than positive
proﬁts; and when selling to all customers of type j ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts from sales to type
j consumers are no greater than the proﬁts it would have earned from setting the price
p1j = p∗
j − 1/αj, and proﬁts at this price are lower than the equilibrium proﬁts because
they are given by the formula above.
There is no proﬁtable deviation which involves selling H to low types and L to high
types because the high types will strictly prefer buying H whenever the low types are willing
to buy H.
It is not necessary to check separately whether there is a proﬁtable deviation involving
selling only good L. If ﬁrm 1 has a proﬁtable deviation which involved selling L at a price
37of p1L to a subset of the consumers, then it also has an even better proﬁtable deviation in
which it sells H at a price of p1L + w/α` −  to the same set of consumers.
To show that the proﬁle given in (a) is an equilibrium it therefore remains only to show
that there is no proﬁtable deviation involving selling H to both populations. When ﬁrm 1
sells H to at least some of the consumers in each population at a price p1H > c its proﬁts



















L − (p1H − w/α`))

(p1H − c)
(The expression is only an upper lower bound and not necessarily the actual proﬁt level
because the quantity sold in each market is at most one.) This is a quadratic that is
maximized at the unique solution to the ﬁrst-order condition. Diﬀerentiating this expression
we ﬁnd after some algebra that it is maximized for












α. This is no























which is the assumption in the statement of the proposition that w < w. This concludes
the proof that the discriminatory proﬁle described in part (a) of the proposition gives a
sequential equilibrium.
To see that the standard pricing game sometimes has an equilibrium in which all con-
sumers buy H at a price of c+1/α (and that there are no other nondiscriminatory equilibria)
consider the possibility of an equilibrium where all consumers buy good H. The same ﬁrst-
order analysis as in the proof of Proposition 1 shows that any equilibrium of this form would
have to have p1H = p2H = c+1/α. This proﬁle will be an equilibrium if ﬁrm 1 cannot gain
either by selling good H to the high types and nothing to the low types or by selling H to
the high types and L to the low types. In the proof of Proposition 1, I noted that there is
no proﬁtable deviation involving only sales to the high types when α`/αh < (3 +
√
17)/2
38because at the price that maximizes proﬁts from sales to the high types, the ﬁrm will sell
to some low types as well. When α`/αh is larger, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt function does have a local
maximum at p1H = c + 1
2α + 1
2αh. Firm 1’s proﬁt when it sets this price and sells to only







. This is larger than 1
α only if α`/αh > 5 +
√
32 ≈ 10.66.
Hence, for the parameter values of the proposition, this deviation is not proﬁtable. In the
proof of Proposition 1, the optimal deviation involving selling both H and L could take
any of three forms. Given the restriction on w in Proposition 2, only the second of these
(corresponding to observation 6 in the earlier proof) arises and the optimal deviation of
this form is p1L = c + 1
2α + 1−w
2α` and p1H = c + 1
2α + 1




















A numerical calculation shows that this deviation is proﬁtable if α`/αh < 6.3 and w is close
to w. When w is close to w (and for all w ∈ (w,w) when α`/αh > 6.4) the deviation is not
proﬁtable and hence there is a nondiscriminatory equilibrium.
To see that there are no other symmetric sequential equilibria in the add-on pricing
game, the only additional possibility that needs to be checked is whether there is an equi-
librium in which each ﬁrm sells L to the low types and H to the high types. There can
be no such equilibrium with both types strictly preferring to buy the good they are buying
because then the ﬁrst order conditions for each ﬁrm not wanting to raise or lower each price
(used in the existence argument) imply that the equilibrium must have piL = c+1/α` and
piH = c+1/αh. There can be no such equilibrium in which the low types are indiﬀerent to
buying H because in that case ﬁrm 1 would proﬁt from lowering the price of the upgrade
by  and selling it to the low types as well. There can be no such equilibrium in which
the high types are indiﬀerent to buying L because (as in the proof of Proposition 1) con-
sidering the ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrm 1 deviating and raising or lowering both p1L and
p1H by exactly the same amount the only possible equilibrium of this form would be to
have p1L = c + 1/α − w/2α and p1H = c + 1/α − w/2α + w/αh. This is not an equlibrium
because ﬁrm 1 could increase its proﬁts by raising p1L slightly. Such a change does not
aﬀect ﬁrm 1’s sales to high types. In the low market ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts (in a neighborhood





























This is positive if w > w.
(b) Consider now the add-on pricing game. Suppose that in a sequential equilibrium both
ﬁrms set piL = p∗
L at t = 1. The ﬁrst thing to note is that at t = 2 the optimal continuation
equilibrium for the ﬁrms involves the add-on being now sold for a price of w/αh (both in
equilibrium and following small deviations).
Claim: If |p1L − p∗
L| < 1/αh and p2L = p∗
L then there is a sequential equilibrium in
which both ﬁrms choose piU = w/αh at t = 2. This is the best equilibrium for the ﬁrms.
To see this note again that because of the structure of the consumer search problem
the only possible equilibrium upgrade prices will be w/α` and w/αh. If both ﬁrms set
piU = w/αh, then at t = 2 the ﬁrm that chose a lower price at t = 1 will be visited by at
least half of the low types and by at most all of the low types. Hence, at least one-third
of the consumers visiting the low priced ﬁrm are high types and the assumption of the
proposition that w/αh > 3w/α` ensures that this ﬁrm is better oﬀ selling to just the high
types. The ﬁrm that set the higher price at t = 1 will be visited my more high types than
low types and is thus also better choosing the high upgrade price.
If ﬁrm 1 deviates from the equilibrium and chooses a price p1L with |p1L − p∗
L| < 1/α`





























= 1 − 2αp1L + αp∗
L + αc − w/2.
Setting p1L = p∗
L and solving we see that the only possible symmetric equilibrium of this
form is p∗
L = c + 1/α − w/2α. This completes the proof of the uniqueness claim of the
proposition.
The calculation above also implies that no deviation from this proﬁle with |p1L −p∗
L| <
1/α` will increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts. To complete the proof that this is indeed an equilibrium
40one needs to verify that larger deviations (for which the expression above is not the correct
proﬁt function) also do not increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts.
To see that no deviation to a price p1L > p∗
L + 1/α` can increase ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts, note
































The derivative is decreasing in p1L and after some algebra one can show that it is negative
when evaluated at p∗
L + 1/α` when w ≥ w. Hence, proﬁts from any deviation in this form
are less than the proﬁts from a deviation to p1L = c+1/α`, which are less than the putative
equilibrium proﬁt by the above argument. (Apart from the algebra the result in this case
should also be obvious: ﬁrms are keeping p1L and p1H farther apart than is optimal. It
would make no sense to increase the already too-high price in market H and abandon
market L.)
To see that there is no proﬁtable deviation with p1L < p2L−1/αh note that with such a
price ﬁrm 1 sells to all of the low and high type consumers. (There cannot be an equilibrium
where ﬁrm 2 attracts some high types by charging a low upgrade price because ﬁrm 2 will
attract no low types and hence would always raise its upgrade price by s once consumers
visit it.) Its proﬁts are bounded above by (p∗
L − 1/αh − c) + (p∗
L − 1/αh + w/αh − c). This
is less than the equilibrium proﬁt of p∗
L + w/2αh − c if
p∗
















The restrictions that w < w and α`/αh < 10 imply that the left hand side is less than four.
The right hand side is always greater than four, so the deviation is never proﬁtable.





that ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts with such a price are














41The proﬁts from such a deviation cannot be proﬁtable if this expression does not have a
local maximum in the interval because we’ve already seen that deviations to either endpoint
of the interval are not proﬁtable. The solution to the ﬁrst order condition for maximizing
the expression above is














































which is true for all w < w as long as α`/αh < 10 because the left hand side is at least
3.32 and the right hand side is at most 4(5.5/
√
10−1) ≈ 2.96. Hence, the deviation cannot
be proﬁtable. (The assumption of the proposition that α`/αh < 10 could be weakened by
computing the proﬁts at the interior optimum when it exists and showing that they remain
below the equilibrium proﬁt level for a broader range of parameter values.)
The ﬁrst-order analysis at the start of the proof of part (b) of the proposition established
that no other ﬁrst-period prices are possible in a symmetric equilibrium in which the ﬁrms
sell the upgrade at a price of w/αh on the equilibrium path and after any small deviation
from the ﬁrst-period equilibrium prices. This does not, however, imply that there are no
other equilibria.
To see that the equilibrium of part (b) of Proposition 1 can be resurrected for at least
some of the parameter values covered under Proposition 2, note that if consumers’ beliefs
are that the ﬁrms set piL = c + 1/α − w/α` at t = 1 and then set piU = w/α` on the
equilibrium path and after nearby deviations, then if ﬁrm 1 raises its upgrade price at all
at t = 2, all low types who visit will refuse to buy the upgrade and some high types will
decide to purchase nothing and visit ﬁrm 2 at t = 4. When s is small ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts will

















(c + 1/α − p1H)

(p1H−c).
42This is precisely the expression we considered when assessing whether in the standard
pricing game there was any proﬁtable deviation from a proﬁle which sold good H to all
consumers at a price of c + 1/α. The result of part (a) of the proposition implies that the
deviation we are considering here cannot be proﬁtable.
To construct equilibria with other proﬁts levels, one could for example, suppose that
ﬁrms 1 and 2 both set piL = c + 1
α − w
2α +  at t = 1 and at t = 2 set piU = w/αh if
there was no deviation and piU = w/α` if there was a deviation. The calculations above
imply that any deviation at t = 1 would produce at most an O() increase in proﬁts if the
ﬁrms charged w/αh at t = 2. When ﬁrms switch to the lower upgrade price they incur a
discrete loss of about w/2αh−w/α`, and hence the net change in proﬁts from the deviation
is negative.
QED
43